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INTRODUCTION*
On November 19, 1984, Mexico experienced the worst industrial disaster of
its history when a liquid petroleum gas (LPG) plant was totally destroyed in a
series of explosions resulting in over 500 deaths, approximately 2,500 injur-
ies, as well as the virtual destruction of a seven block area of a working-
class neighborhood adjacent to the facility.
Within hours it became clear to most people that the explosions had orig-
inated in the storage plant itself, a facility owned and operated by PEMEX,
the national oil corporation. Although official confirmation of PEMEX's re-
sponsibility did not come for a number of weeks, the corporation came under
considerable pressure when pointed queries were made concerning its safety
record and its judgment in locating the plant in a populated urban area.
Growing public criticism and alarm put the government and PEMEX, its most
powerful parastatal, on the defensive. As soon as the urgent logistical prob-
lems of rescue and emergency assistance had been resolved, the government's
attention turned to limiting the political damage resulting from the event.
It became imperative for the government to respond in a timely and effec-
tive manner to the disaster. In the days and weeks following the explosion,
its multiple agencies, organizations, and departments assumed most of the
major, and several of the minor, roles in the recovery effort. In all re-
spects the State set the agenda for recovery and monopolized the decisions
*This paper is based on a six week field visit to Mexico City during December
1984 and January 1985. The study was sponsored by the Natural Hazards Re-
search and Applications Information Center and funded by a National Science
Foundation Quick Response Travel Grant. I owe thanks to R.W. Kates, W.
Riebsame, and S. Tubbesing. I am also grateful for the generous assistance
given to me in Mexico by officials of the Federal District's Disaster Protec-
tion Unit (S.I.P.R.O.R.), and by Dr. Ovsei Gelman of the National Univer-
sity.
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shaping the pace and form of reconstruction. Despite the overwhelming govern-
ment presence, the survivors were by no means passive actors. in the recovery
process. Community-based groups articulated their needs and organized assem-
blies and demonstrations in an attempt to influence the terms of the recovery
agenda.
This paper provides an account and preliminary assessment of the early
stages of recovery from the San Juan Ixhuatepec gas explosion disaster. Spe-
cial attention is paid to the activities and decisions taken during the two
months following the explosion. This period encompasses the principal
decisions and events, including major changes in land use, affecting the long-
term reconstruction process. In addition, it provides insights into the
strengths and weaknesses of a particular style of disaster management which
can best be termed authoritarian-paternalistic.
The first section of the paper offers a short description of the geo-
graphic setting and historical evolution of the disaster site. San Juan
Ixhuatepec is located in the State of Mexico in an area due north of the Fed-
eral District. San Juan Ixhautepec is part of the northern zone of metropoli-
tan Mexico City which has experienced dramatic industrial expansion and popu-
lation growth over the past two decades (see Map 1). However, unlike .Bhopal
where squatter settlements grew up in the imme~iate vicinity of the Union
Carbide plant after the latter was established, the village of San Juan
Ixhuatepec predates PEMEX and the industrial expansion of Mexico City by sev-
eral centuries. Its complex history of occupance and the resulting conflict-
ing claims over land use, access, and ownership are an important element in
the differential vulnerability to risk experienced by sectors of its popula-
tion, as well as a factor influencing the ultimate pattern of post-disaster
-3-
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reconstruction.
Following a brief account of events on the day of the ~xplosion, the sec-
ond section of the paper describes the activities, decisions, and conflicts
during the aftermath of the disaster. Special emphasis is given to the role
of the State as the principal decision maker during this period. However,
other aspects, in particular the general public's overwhelming response to the
event, and the event's significance in popular and political culture are also
noted.
The final section of the paper discusses the issues raised by Mexico's
experience with disaster recovery. Some of these issues concern questions,
such as the relation between state power and urban working-class neighborhood
organizations, that are fairly specific to Mexico's current social and politi-
cal circumstances. Other issues, such as the actual level, timing, and effi-
cacy of disaster and .recovery planning, lend themselves to a comparison of the
Mexican case with other instances of disaster recovery. The bases for a sys-
tematic comparison are provided by the 1977 Haas et al. study1 of reconstruc-
tion after the Managua earthquake, and are discussed in a preliminary manner
in this paper. Finally, perhaps the most significant issues raised by
Mexico's gas disaster concern the urban ecology of risk generated by extraor-
dinary rates of urban growth, rapid industrial development, and weak zoning
and regulatory controls. These are conditions Mexico City shares with Bhopal
and dozens of other urban centers in developing countries. Models of hazard-
ous facility siting and technological risk assessments designed for the indus-
trialized world may be largely irrelevant to situations such as those now
prevailing in metropolitan Mexico City.
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THE SETTING
San Juan Ixhautepec, better known as San Juanico, is an ancient settle-
ment located on the northern edge of what is now metropolitan Mexico City.
Its history dates back at least to Aztec times when Ixhuatepec was known as
the place of green maize leaves. 2 The hamlet occupied flat lands adjacent to
the banks of a river in a narrow valley surrounded on three sides by steep
hills. Beyond these hills to the south were the lakes and the island city of
Tenochtitlan.
During colonial times Ixhuatepec acquired the second part of its name
when Juan Diego, the humble Indian peasant who experienced a vision of the
nation's patron saint, the Virgin of Guadalupe, came to live in the community
for a period of time. A church housing an antique painting commemorating the
first baptism of Indians in San Juanico by Spanish missionaries was built dur-
ing the eighteenth century.3 As time passed, community lands were annexed to
an hacienda in the northern half of the valley. Following this, a rail line
connecting Mexico City to the coast traversed the valley marking a boundary
between San Juan Ixhuatepec's peasants and the hacienda estate.
The years following the Mexican revolution brought prosperity to the vil-
lage which rapidly grew to become a thriving agricultural community linked to
Mexico City's produce markets. In time, however, the city's labor demands
transformed this agricultural settlement into a labor reserve peri-urban com-
munity. This was an important step in San Juanico's final absorption into
metropolitan Mexico City.
New settlements grew up around the original village site. As migrants
arrived from the countryside, shanty towns with names like San Juan Lomas and
La Presa crept up the steep hillslopes, and a string of "irregular" dwellings
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were established along the rail line within meters of the tracks. Most re-
cently a middle-class residential development and golf course were built on
land formerly owned by the hacienda. Over the past 30 years the population of
the original San Juan Ixhautepec grew from a few thousand to over 30,000 in-
habitants, while that of the overall valley and hills lopes skyrocketed to
roughly 300,000. This growth reflects that of Mexico City as a whole wherein
dozens of agricultural villages located on the urban fringe being transformed
into urban residential and industrial zones within a matter of a decade or
less. 4
. In the case of San Juan Ixhuatepec, an important element in this process
was PEMEX's 1961 decision to locate an LPG storage and distribution facility
on federal lands across the railroad tracks from San Juanico. When completed,
the facility covered 30 acres and included two large spherical tanks, four
medium size upright cylindrical; and 48 smaller horizontal cylindrical con-.
tainers 12 meters long and 2.5 meters in diameter with a total capacity of
80,000 barrels of LPG. The facility became an important node in the network
linking production sites on the Gulf Coast with urban users, ultimately pro-
viding 40% of the metropolitan area's gas supplies.
The PEMEX facility led to a very rapid industrial and residential devel-
opment of San Juan Ixhuatepec in the years following 1961. Seven private gas
distributors established themselves in the immediate vicinity of the storage
site on land acquired from the former hacienda. By 1984, over 40 industries
(including petrochemical firms, a paint factory, a paper mill, a foundry, a
glass factory, and a saw mill) were located in the valley floor. To these
PEMEX recently added an oil storage facility in the northwest section of the
valley.
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As the valley became populated by an increasing number of industries and
as thousands of newcomers squatted on hillslope settlements lacking running
water and sanitation, environmental conditions in San Juanico deteriorated
rapidly. The once clean Remedios River is now an open canal carrying raw sew-
age and industrial wastes, and its steep banks are strewn with refuse and
feces. Factories pour tons of pollutants into the atmosphere. Heavy traffic
from the nearby highway generates emissions dangerously contaminating San
Juanico's air with carbon monoxide, ozone, sulfur dioxide, lead, nitrous
oxide, and dust. The community now lives under an almost perpetual blanket of
smog. 5 These airborne hazards are compounded by risks underground. San
Juanico's subsoil is crisscrossed by a network of gas pipe lines, many of
which are decades old and in poor repair. 6
The result of rapid expansion has been a complex land use pattern featur-
ing a mix of residual agrictiltural land and former hacienda structures held by
private estate owners; along with a middle-class low-density resident~al area
partially buffered by topography from the high density working-class neighbor-
hoods situated in close proximity to a concentration of industrial firms hand-
ling a variety of hazardous materials (see Map 2). While the industries are
located on the prime lands of the valley floor, the working-class neighbor-
hoods occupy mor~ varied types of lands: t~e long-term consolidated settle-
ment of San Juan Ixhuatepec bounded on the north by the railroad track and on
the south by the Remedios River; boundary areas occupied by squatters along
the railroad track immediately adjacent to PEMEX and some of the private gas
distributors; newer settlements occupying the hillslopes. The quality of
housing in San Juanico reflects the varied incomes, security of tenure, and
levels of consolidation achieved by successive waves of immigrants. The
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center of the community is characterized by one and two story masonry struc-
tures, interior patios, and metal grillwork on doors and wi~dows. Hillslope
houses are mostly one or two room dwellings of adobe of cement block with cor-
rugated metal roofs. Dwellings located along the railroad tracks are made
mostly of impermanent, flimsy materials.
A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS ON NOVEMBER 19, 1984
At 5:40 on the morning of Monday, November 19, 1984 San Juan Ixhuatepec
and its surroundings were awakened by the sound of a massive explosion. In
seconds a giant fireball engulfed large portions of the community sending its
residents fleeing from their homes to seek refuge on the nearby highway and
hills. The first explosion was followed by a succession of lesser and greater
blasts that burned hundreds of people exposed on the streets as they attempted
to escape from their collapsing dwellings. The explosions also propelled
large metal shards into the surrounding neighborhood, landing on houses up to
1.5 kilometers away.? In all, 54 steel tanks holding millions of liters of
liquid butane and propane gas exploded and went up in flames in a conflagra-
tion that took firemen 14 hours to bring under control. 8
Half an hour after the first explosion, Mexico's Defense Minister ordered
an emergency plan, the DN-III-E to be put into effect (see Figure 1). By that
time soldiers and federal road patrols had already arrived in San Juan
Ixhuatepec. Ambulances, firemen, and reporters were on their way to the scene
from qll parts of the Federal District as well as from the states of Mexico
and Hidalgo. The police closed the major highway traversing the area while
soldiers assisted in the evacuation of the panic-stricken population.
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Figure ~
The San Juan Ixhuatepec Gas Explosion: A Chronology of Events 9
5:40
5:42
5:45
5:50
6:00
6:10
6:14
6:17
6:47
6:59
7:00
7:00-11:00 AM
7:30
8:00
9:00
9:30
9:50
10:00
11:50
14:00
15:30
20:00
First explosion
San Juan Ixhuatepec engulfed by fireballs
Residents flee to road and hills to South and West
First alarm received at a Federal District firestation
Second explosion
Federal police close Mexico-Pachuca highway
First detachment of soldiers arrives
Defense Secretary declares emergency DN-III-E plan in effect
Another explosion, neighborhood engulfed by flames again
Reporters and photographers arrive on scene
Police, firemen, and ambulances arrive
Hundreds ~f wounded and others start arriving on foot and by
car at the Indios Verdes Metro station,
Lesser explosions
Army starts to evaculate area
PEMEX shuts off 4 gas pipelines to facility
Large explosion keeps firemen at a distance
Disaster announced on television, comparisons with Hiroshima
and Nagasaki lead to general panic, in northern areas of the
city
Series of lesser explosions
Crowds block major access roads to disaster site
Church bells chime continuously
Firemen contain flames within a 2 km. radius
Soldiers cordon off large area
First injured treated at hospitals
State Governor arrives at site
Northern zone of city cut off
600 factories close
Electricity, water, and telephones shut off
Tens of thousands of refugees begin to arrive at national. I
!
shrine of the Virgin of Guadalupe
Fire chief declares situation under control
PEMEX officials warn of possible further explosions
200,000 to 250,000 people have fled or have been evacuated
Firemen contain fire to storage facility where gas continues
to burn
Fire extinguished
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At the outset, the fire, explosions, and number of casualties overwhelmed
the rescue efforts. As explosions continued, firemen were ~nable to get near
enough to bring the flames under control. As tens of thousands of people fled
to the highway, ambulances were unable to get through to pick up the wounded
;who were emerging from the disaster area. During the first hour residents had
to rescue one another. By 6:15 hundreds of people, among whom were many of
the wounded, had made their way to a nearby Metro station and, with the help
\
of commuters on their way to work, arrived at nearby medical centers by public
transportation. Others made their way to the national shrine of Guadalupe
where by 10: 00 in the morning thousands of refugees· began to congregate.
By 8:00 a.m. firemen managed to contain the conflagration within a two
kilometer radius, and the army, after cordonning off a large zone, began to
evacuate those who had not already fled. By noon the ~orthern zone of the
city was cut off, its factories closed, and its apprehensive inhabitants were
left without electricity and other services. By mid afterno6n the fire was
limited to the storage facility, and approximately 250,000 people had been
evacuated. City hospitals had admitted over 4,000 injured people, and rescue
teams continued to collect the bodies of what, by official accounts, were to
be 500 casualties from the rubble of San Juan IXh~atepec.lO In all, over
2,OO~ houses were damaged and 150 were completely destroyed by the explosions,
fire, and metal shards from the tanks. By nightfall the first phase of the
emergency was over.
THE AFTERMATH
In the two months following November 19, the people of San Juanico tried
to recover from their personal and material losses and rebuild their l'ives.
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During this period PEMEX was forced to acknowledge its responsibility for the
disaster, and government officials from a variety of agencies and ministries
addressed the multiple demands and tasks of community relief and reconstruc-
tion. In addition, the media and the public at large raised pointed questions
about PEMEX's culpability and, on a broader level, issues regarding the vul-
nerability of Mexico City's population to the new risks implicit in its rapid
industrial growth.
It was during these critical, self-questioning times that authorities
made major decisions regarding victims' rights to compensation as well as
choices resulting in significant land use changes in San Juan Ixhuatepec.
Although most, if not all, of these decisions were made in a 'paternalistic,
top-down fashion, government officials were by no means immune to public pres-
sure. The image of responsiveness became as important to the State as its
actual ability to respond to the crisis effectively. In a short time, the
political management of the disaster and its consequences overshadowed the
technical and logistical tasks.
The unfolding of these decisions and activities during the early recovery
period reveals a great deal about the manner in which the Mexican State man-
ages the aftermath of a large-scale, politically sensitive disaster. More-
over, in the case of San Juan Ixhuatepec, the disaster aftermath provides an
example of the effects of authoritarian disaster management upon an urban
working class community attempting to recover from a calamity.
The following pages detail the events and activities occurring during
this critical period. Using as an organizing framework a model developed by
Haas and others to describe and compare sequential stages of recovery from
disaster, I will argue that the Mexican case, while bearing important simiJar-
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ities to the general pattern common to other disaster recoveries, also exhib-
its important differences. In large measure, these differences stem from the
highly charged political overtones of a disaster laid at the doorstep of the
country's most important parastatal.
The model developed by Haas and others in their study of recovery in
Managua and other cities posits four stages of disaster recovery activity:
(1) the emergency period, during which all of the community's normal social
and economic activities cease; (2) the restoration period, in which the physi-
cal and service functions are restored at a rudimentary level; (3) the first
reconstruction period, in which major infrastructure and urban functions are
fully recovered; and (4) the second reconstruction period, characterized by
major improvements, developments, and commemorative structures (Haas et al.,
1977, pp. xxvi-xxviii). The authors argue that although these activities
overlap to a degree, they are largely sequential, each phase lasting approxi-
mately ten times as long as the preceding one. Their empirical studies demon-
strate that the rate of post-disaster recovery is influenced by factors such
as the magnitude of the damage, the resources available for recovery, pre-
disaster trends, and the planning and organizational capacities of those
responsible for reconstruction (Haas, et al., 1977, pp. 12). Using this model
it is possible, as its authors have done, to compare different instances of
disaster recovery of different magnitudes in diverse settings.
A review of the events unfolding during the weeks following the November
19 gas explosion reveals a sequence of activities and indicators similar to
those set forth in the general model. However, important differences in the
timing and pattern of the recovery stages make the Mexican experience diverge
from both the general model and other historical cases. These differences
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concern, most importantly, the accelerated rate of recovery, which, lasting a
little over ten weeks, was much shorter than might have.been predicted by the
algorithm of the model. Moreover, in what is perhaps a unique aspect of this
case, the last phase of recovery, Reconstruction II, involving activities
associated with civic improvement, commemorative developments, and the like,
overlapped with other phases of recovery, having a decisive impact upon them.
An important factor in the pace and pattern of the recovery effort was
the prompt implementation of official measures decreed by the Governor of the
State of Mexico when he arrived at the scene of the disaster four hours after
the explosion. These measures concerned five major spheres of activity (re-
lief assistance, material and economic support, establishment of a communica-
tions and information system, prevention of future catastrophes, and determi-
nation of responsibilities) to be executed within a specified time frame:
(1) immediate action (the first 15 days); (2) short term action (16 to 90 days
after the disaster); and (3) medium term action (90 days to one year after the
disaster).11 The manner in which these measures were implemented, as well as
the response they evoked among those whom they affected, are described in the
pages to follow. For analytic purposes the account is organized according to
the general stage model of disaster recovery discussed above. However, it
should be noted that in many respects the first three stages of the model are
quite similar to those of the actual assistance and recovery plan implemented
by the state of Mexico. Figure 2 provides a useful diagram of the four stages
along with a number of relevant indicators discussed in the text.
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Emergency (November 19 - November 21)
The emergency period lasted approximately three days and was experienced
in varying degrees of length and severity by different sectors of the popula-
tion in the larger San Juan Ixhuatepec valley area. On the morning of the day
following the explosion, a zone of about 8 square kilometers remained cor-
donned off by-troops, and roughly 250,000 of its inhabitants were housed in
temporary shelters. Almost 2,500 people were being treated for wounds in hos~
pitals, while relatives of those who had died were attempting to identify
remains and prepare for their burial in a mass grave. The death toll con-
tinued to mount as the most severely injured died in hospitals and as rescue
workers recovered more bodies from the rubble. Over 14 hectares of San
Juanico which before the explosion had housed approximately 3,000 people were
destroyed, and an additional 15 hectares of dwellings were seriously damaged.
In addition to its impact on San Juanico, the effects of the disaster were-
felt over a latge area of northern metropolitan Mexico City where utilitie~
had been cut off and over 600 factories had shut down, idling thousands of
workers.
Significantly, this day coincided with a major natioDal holiday marking
the anniversary of Mexico's revolution. ,November 20 is characteristically the
occasion when PRI, the country's ruling party, celebrates the accomplishments
of the revolution during its long tenure in office. As hours passed, it be-
came increasingly clear that the responsibility for the disaster probably
resided with PEMEX. This fact cast a shadow on the celebration, as the
regime, ever sensitive to the ideological implications of events, was put on
the defensive. The President, after a somber speech at the ceremony, flew
over San Juanico in a helicopter and ordered an assessment of the damage.
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By this time, Humberto Lira Mora, the Attorney General of the State of
Mexico, whom the Governor had put in charge of coordinating assistance to the
disaster victims, had set up headquarters in the nearby city hall of Ecatepec.
From there, teams of doctors, coroners, and lawyers carried out the priority
task of counting and identifying casualties, and issuing death certificates
prior to burial. In addition, engineers and public works personnel began a
preliminary assessment of damage to community structures and utilities and
thereby demarcated three impact zones: most affected (a seven block core
zone), partially affected (a large portion of old San Juan Ixhuatepec), and
least affected (the largely undamaged perimeter). This classification would
serve as the basis for organizing the evacuees' phased return to the area, and
subsequently as a guide for post-disaster land use planning (State of Mexico,
1985, pp. 7-9).
By the third day after the explosion, authorities had allowed all people
living in the least affected areas to return to their homes. Workmen were
busy restoring utilities and many factories had resumed operations. The popu-
lation in the shelters decreased dramatically. Official agencies which had
been overwhelmed by private donations of food and clothing issued a plea to
the general public to stop sending assistance in kind and, instead, to make
contributions to a victims' benefit fund.
As things were beginning to return to normal in the perimeter area, the
main part of San Juanico remained cordonned off and its population scattered
in shelters, hospitals, or among relatives and friends. ~hile the emergency
had ended for most of those who had been evacuated, it continued for about
30,000 of the most affected population. It was not until the fifth day that
residents of all but the seven block devastated zone were allowed to return to
their homes.
-18-
Restoration (November 22 - December 9, 1984)
Within two days of the disaster high government officials decided not to
rebuild the seven block 'most affected' area destroyed by the explosion and
fire. It was decided that in its place there would be a park. This decision,
having a major impact on the area's land use as well as upon the lives of
those who lived there, was to shape the course of the entire recovery pro-
cess.
At the outset, the community believed that the park would be built on
PEMEX property at the site of the explosion itself. However, when bulldozers
began to demolish the remaining structures in the core zone, San Juanico's
residents awoke to the fact that what had been termed a 'commemorative park'
would be carved out of their own community. By the time, ten days later, that
an officially constituted Interministerial Commission made the formal
announcement that the PEMEX facility would be relocated and a park would be
built, major steps had already been taken to put this land use change into
effect, and the adversarial course of State-community relations had been set.
The restoration period itself commenced five days after the explosion
when large quantities of building materials provided by the state of Mexico
were delivered to San Juanico. lEven as the rescue teams discovered new bodies
in the ruins, municipal workers began to clear debris from the streets and
reconnect utilities in the damaged areas. ' In the days that followed, teams of
sanitation workers fumigated houses, and notaries public officially certified
the return of homes to surviving families. While the core zone remained cor-
donned off and guarded by troops, other parts of the community returned to
life. Food, clothing, and building materials were distributed to residents,
some stores resumed business, and nine days after the explosion, the central
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market and schools reopened.
\The construction of a park displaced over 180 families -who had survived
the explosion in the core zone. On the fifth day following the explosion,
officials announced that all these families would be provided with housing in
Valle de Anahuac, a newly constructed working-class development located ten
kilometers to the east of San Juanico (see Map 1).) The first families were
j
settled on the following day. "The location and miniscule size of the houses
(approximately 270 square feet) gave rise to protests from families who often
had to crowd up to ten members into these two room dwellings far from their
friends and familiar community.
The restoration period lasted approximately two and a half weeks. lEy
'-.-.~-
December 9, three weeks after the explosion, 90% of the homeless had been
\
housed. \ In the affected areas of San Juanico debris clearance was complete,
most building materials had been distributed, utilities and services had been
restored, and an extensive apparatus for administering relief assistance was
in place.
,It is important to note that the government had adhered to its own e~er-
'------
gency relief plan timetable~ Within 15 days of the explosion, "most of the
population had returned home or been given new houses, and basic services and
civil activities were normalized" (State of Mexico, 1985, pp. 11).
At the same time, the death toll kept mounting as burn victims continued
to die in hospitals. By official accounts over 300 people, about one-thirn of
whom were in critical condition, were still hospitalized at this time. ~:
hastily established health center in San Juanico was attending over 200 out-
patients a day. Its director reported that while supplies were plentiful,
many patients needed specialized treatment for both physical and emotional
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traumas. 12 The latter were magnified during this period by a series of gas
leaks from underground pipes which continued for at least two weeks after the
explosion.
Reconstruction I (November 24, 1984 - January 30, 1985)
The reconstruction phase of the San Juan Ixhuatepec gas explosion stands
out among other instances of disaster recovery because of the speed with which
it was accomplished and the expeditious manner in which the procedure and
mechanisms for compensating its victims were devised and executed. Given the
length of the prior restoration phase (18 days), Reconstruction I could have
been expected to take approximately 180 days to complete. In fact, this phase
actually took only 63 days, a little over one-third that time.
The reconstruction of San Juan Ixhuatepec involved decisions and activi-
ties in three areas: (1) physical reestablishment of private housing damaged
by fire or metal shards in San Juanico itself, and provision of permanent
housing for the homeless at the relocation site of Valle de Anahuac; (2) re-
establishment of a minimum sense of community security; and (3) assuring the
well-being of housholds with members who had been killed or injured.
Repairs by homeowners began shortly after authorities set up a system for
delivering building materials provided by the government of the State of
Mexico. Three weeks after the explosion these distributions peaked and by
Christmas the major part of the damage to residential structures in the com-
munity had been repaired.
By this time all but a few of the homeless 180 families had been settled
at Valle de Anahuac. As days went by and the reality of the park became cer-
tain in most minds, it became clear that these dwellings were to be a perma-
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nent relocation solution for those displaced by government orders. While this
solution was adequate for those whose San Juanico dwellings -had been small,
makeshift, and lacking in utilities, and for others who did not care ever to
return to the scene of the disaster, it was strongly opposed by those who h~d
possessed better, and in particular, larger houses in San Juanico. Many of
the latter were old-time ejidatarios whose families had lived in the community
for generations and whose relatively large properties allowed them to keep
farm animals such as chickens, pigs, and even cows. For many of the old-
timers the loss of their homes was compounded by the loss of their commu-
nity.13
The second element of Reconstruction I was the reestablishment of 2 sense
of community security. Virtually all of San Juanico's residents wanted p~X
and the private gas companies to leave. Thus much anxiety was focussed on the
possibility that PEMEX might rebuild its facility. When, on December 2, the
Interministerial Commission issued its preliminary findings and recommenda-
tions stipulating that the facility not be rebuilt and that the private gas
distributors relocate, the people of San Juanico felt a strong sense of relief
and moral vindication. However, much unease persisted because nothing had
been done to remove the wreckage of the PEMEX facility, which presented a
macabre backdrop to the newly constructed park. In addition, owing to the
city's urgent demand for gas, all but two of the area's private gas aistri~~­
tors had resumed their operations with gas brought in by trucks froE out-
of-state PEMEX faci1ities. 14 Many in the community felt that soon it ~ld be
business as usual for these hazardous firms.
The third and very important component of Reconstruction I ~s the ~r~
cess whereby victims received compensation. Although not ~tho~t its fuars~
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critics, the speed and efficiency with which most of the surviving victims
were awarded monetary compensation was one of the truly remarkable features of
the Mexican case. The process involved a series ~f complex legal and adminis-
trative steps, including, first, assigning legal responsibility for the explo-
sion; second, devising a mechanism to evaluate and set compensation levels for
death, for a range of types of injuries, and for property damage; and finally,
setting in motion a procedure for disbursing payments to thousands -of individ-
uals.
The first step required assigning legal responsibility for the explo-
sion. This was accomplished on the "basis of the Attorney General's investiga-
tion. The preliminary report summarizing the investigation's findings was
made public on December 22. In the report the Attorney General concluded that
"the explosion started in the PEMEX facility" and that "PEMEX must accept its
objective social responsibility" and "deliver the necessary funds to cover
compensation for all material and personal damages." PEMEX's head, Mario
Beteta then publically accepted the Attorney General's findings, "PEMEX
assumes moral and civil responsibility for the disaster," and stated that
PEMEX would announce the outlines of its compensation procedure the following
week. IS
At the outset, PEMEX would negotiate with its insuror (a consortium of 30
domestic and foreign companies) for the appropriate funds. In the absence of
legislation to guide compensation to indiv~duals and communities harmed by
industrial accidents, the Attorney General's report recommended that compensa-
tion levels be determined on the basis of provisions set out in the federal
labor law. This decision reveals a remarkable degree of flexibility on the
government's part induced, perhaps, by a sense of urgency and a belief held at
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the highest levels of the administration that the San Juanico situation had to
be resolved in an effective and timely manner. The government's ai~ was to
issue all compensations (including payments for loss of life, injury, and
property damage) during the month of January.
According to official criteria, compensations for loss of life would
equal 730 days of minimum wage, plus one-third again as much for moral injury,
and one-third for funeral costs; the total to equal a little over IT.S. 5!r')),!i](i1(1)j
(at January, 1985 rates of exchange). These payments would be made for chfl-
dren as well as for adults (State of Mexico, 1985, p. 12). Begi!l!l!d.ng JaliItilliary
--2, 1985, compensation payments for loss of life, along vith those for ~m2ge
to personal property, were issued by officials at the rate of 5{)i a day.
In addition, the injured were examined on an individual basis by a t~
of physicians and experts in labor medicine. Compensation was determined im
each case according to a complex formula in which the extent of irrjrory W25
established on the basis of functional, aesthetic, and psychological cri-
teria. 16 Except for those still in hospitals, injured ~rvivors ~re ezam£rned
and processed at a rate of 25 a day in two nearby health centers fuegimrning in
early January.
The official report of the disaster issued by t~e State of ~ico ~m~
Spring of 1985 states that as of tha: time a total of 1836 claim$ ~68T for
material damages, 780 for injury, and 419 for deat~) ~~tirng to a.~5 m~llt~
dollars (at January, 1985 rates of exchange) bad beem pai& to i~wi&mel
claimants in San Juanico (State of Mexico, 1985, p. 13).
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Reconstruction II (November 21, 1984 - November 19, 1985)
The general recovery model posits a second phase of reconstruction encom-
passing developments shaping the long-term growth of the affected community.
Activities characterizing this phase involve improvements in the community's
physical structures, services, or facilities. This phase would hypothetically
last approximately ten times as long as Reconstruction I. In the case of the
San Juan Ixhuatepec disaster, Reconstruction II could thus be expected to last
roughly two years (68 days times 10).
From the outset Reconstruction II assumed great significance in San Juan
Ixhuatepec, with its associated activities and artifacts being invested with
considerable ideological import. Perhaps for this reason, Reconstruction II
activities overlapped and even preceded those of other periods. If the-con-
struction of the promised health center, technical school, and kindergarten
run according to schedule and are completed by November, 1985, then Recon-
struction II will have taken only half the time projected by the general model
and typical of other historical cases of disaster recovery.
The present section provides a summary of the activities associated with
Reconstruction II, including a short description of growing community opposi-
tion to the authorities' decisions and agenda. The political and ideological
implications of Reconstruction II, including the State-community conflict over
the terms of disaster recovery will be analyzed in a section to follow.
The major tangible elements of Reconstruction II in its initial phase
were the large 14 hectare 'commemorative' park, along with paved streets and
sidewalks throughout the affected area. In addition, there were other intan-
gible, but very real, moral and ideological aspects to Reconstruction II
implicit in the government's campaign of national solidarity with the victims
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of the disaster.
On November 21, when the dust had hardly settled and bodies were still
being recovered from the ruins, an unnamed official was reported to have
announced that grass and trees would be planted at the scene of the disaster
to provide "a visual buffer."17 Shortly thereafter, the newly constituted
Interministerial Commission declared that the PEMEX facility would be replaced
by a park. These declarations were met with universal approval among the
public at large who felt that restitution was owed to the survivors of the
devastated community. This spurred activity and planning for the park. Even
before residents were allowed to return to their homes in the affected areas
of San Juanico, the first Eteps were taken to implement these decisions. The
realization that the park would be located in their own community rather than
on PEMEX's land ignited the first of a series of anti-PEMEX~ anti-government
demonstrations. On November 25, less than one week after the explosion, an
estimated 20,000 San Juanico residents assembled in the cordonned-off zone
demanding that PEMEX and, the gas distributors leave the area and that the
demolition of houses be halted. 18 The generally adversarial tone of the
demonstration was tempered by expression of thanks to the firemen and troops
for their efforts during the emergency.
This did not stop the bulldozers. By November 29, ten days after the ex-
plosion, the demolition of the core zone was complete. Newspaper accounts re-
corded numerous expressions of community dissatisfaction and anxiety during'
the days that fol19wed. Many complaints focussed on perceived incompetence
and corruption in the delivery of food and relief assistance. Other criti-
cisms were levelled at what was seen as the forcible relocation of people from
the core zone and at the inadequate size of the housing provided at Valle de
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Anahuac. Community sentiments found expression in slogans painted during the
night on walls and sidewalks: "No park. We want houses," ".Where did all the
aid go?" "PEMEX and gas companies get out.,,19
On December 11, the severely beaten body of a community leader was found
on a nearby hillside. This event, along with the abrupt transfer of a parish
priest who had been critical of PEMEX and the government, helped escalate ten-
sions.
On December 16, survivors voiced their dissatisfaction in a large commu-
nity meeting which issued a formal written petition demanding that: (1) "our
tragedy not be used for political ends," (2) a complete account be made of all
assistance donations; (3) fatalities be compensated at a rate of no less than
u.s. $17,000; (4) forcible relocations be halted and that "housing be recon-
structed in San Juanico itself; and (5) the government take ~own the official
banners'and political signs it had placed throughout the community. When the
meeting was broken up by the police, people reassembled and demonstrated at a
site nearby.20
I
On December 23, the day following the Attorney General's report, members
of-the community held another march, demonstration, and assembly. The action
was sponsored by a newly constituted Neighborhood Committee. San Juanico was
generally unimpressed by the Attorney General's findings since it had been ob-
vious to them for over a month that the explosion started at PEMEX and not
elsewhere. 21 They were likewise unmoved by the promise of a soon to be com-
pleted park equipped with basketball courts, grass, trees, lighting, and a
fountain, arguing that it should have been built at the PEMEX site. Noting
the incidence of anguish and emotional upset resulting from the disaster, and
arguing that the daily sight of the burnt tanks and exploded cylinders was an
affront to the survivors, the Neighborhood Committee demanded that PEMEX at
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least remove the wreckage from its facilities. While the assembly was tense
for fear of reprisals and arrests, its message was clear: ~We want a just
compensation, not charity."22
The next step in the confrontation between the authorities and the com-
munity was over the terms of the compensation process. Following the Attorney
/
General's report, PEMEX announced that it "accepted its moral and civic
~
responsibility, but no blame, since the disaster was caused by an accident in-
herent in the hazardous nature of this type of facility."23 PEMEX, moreover,
assured the public that all damages would be covered in a prompt and orderly
way in a short period of time. These assurances did not molify the Neighbor-
hood Committee whose members argued that the official figures drastically
underestimated the number of victims. On January 1, 1985, the Neighborhood
Committee issued its own estimate of the toll: 2,000 dead, 3,000 wounded, and
1,500 missing. 24
Over the following weeks, as claims for material damages, loss of life,
and injury were being processed, community anxiety reached a high point. 25 On
January 11, the PSUM, a coalition of left-wing opposition parties, charged
that the San Juanico victims were being cheated. PSUM cited Articles 1913 and
1915 of the Labor Code stipulating a payment equivalent to 2,800 days of mini-
mum wage per death, ,instead of the lower figure of 730 days used to calculate
the official compensation levels.
In a few days, thi~ charge was followed by a large public assembly called
by the Neighborhood Commmittee. During the meeting residents aired a wide
range of complaints revealing the depths of their frustration and dissatisfac-
tion with the government's handling of the recovery. The strongest protests
focussed on the "arbitrary, capricious, and unjust" compensation procedure,
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including what were perceived to be unjustifiably low compensations for mate-
rial damages, an underestimation of the number of casua~ties, and the setting
of lower compensations for women. At a time when work on the park was nearing
completion, many of the survivors still viewed it as "an affront.,,26 Resi-
dents also deplored the government's refusal to accep~ offers of foreign medi-
cal assistance for severe burn cases.
Underlying .all the demands and complaints was a widely shared_feeling
that the authorities were acting in a disrespectful, highhanded, and intimi-
dating manner toward the community, using its troubles for their own political
ends.
DISCUSSION
Judged on the basis of conventional indicators and measures, there is no
doubt that San Juan Ixhuatepec's recovery from disaster was both rapid and
effective. To a large degree, this was because the State immediately assumed
decision-making power over virtually all aspects of the recovery process.
While criticism has been levelled at the quality of State-provided recovery
assistance (e.g., incompetent hospital care, a poor location and inadequate
size of substitute housing, relatively low sums paid in compensation to the
victims), a strong case can be made that swift and comprehensive assistance
accompanied by immediate physical reconstruction is more just and less damag-
ing in the long-term than more ambitious programs and higher compensations
that might be obtained after long delays and years of litigation.
However, the authoritarian-paternalistic model of disaster recovery is
not without its costs and hidden injuries. By its nature calamity disrupts
people's lives and deprives them of control over their day-to-day routines.
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Therefore, one important task of disaster recovery is to progressively restore
an effective decision-making sphere to a population temporarily traumatized
and rendered dependent. The cost of an authoritarian approach is that it
impedes this process, creating new dependencies and, at times, intense resent-
ment among the sutvivors. As demonstrated in the case of San Juanico, parts
of the recovery program were challenged by members of the community who rapid-
ly organized themselves into a pressure group to oppose the State's agenda and
protect themselves against its more repressive measures.
Three aspects of San Juanico's recovery from disaster merit discussion.
First, the role of public pressure in spurring the government's swift, full-
scale involvement in disaster management reveals a great deal about the ideo-
logical and symbolic import of the event. Second, San Juanico's experience
following the disaster raises questions about the possibilities for community
involvement in decisions affecting both their immediate well-being and those
leading to long-term changes in the community's land use and vulnerability to
future hazards. The boundary between State authority and community power also
underlies to the final issue addressed in this paper:' the evolution of high
risk urban ecological settings in rapidly industrializing countries. The
lessons provided by recent disasters such as those of San Juan Ixhuatepec,
CUbatao, Bhopal, and Ciudad Juarez have yet to be fully understood and assim-
ilated by urban planners and risk experts •
.
-+-I
Public Response to the Disaster
Within hours of the explosion, Mexico City's population was riveted by
accounts transmitted by radio and television crews who had rushed to the scene
of the disaster. For days thereafter deep feelings of empathy expressed in
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the often-voiced term ~~~~~~~idad' created an expanded sense of community
among the metropolis' heterogeneous groups and classes.\ 'Solidaridad' also
resulted in such a large flow of material support from concerned individuals
(primarily in the form of food, clothing, and blood) that the official distri-
bution channels were overwhelmed. The day-to-day operations of some of the
Federal District's 16 municipal centers came to a halt as the staff attempted
to handle the large volume of donations. 27 In many cases the logistics and
available manpower were not equal to the task of assembling, organizing,
transporting, and delivering the mass of individual donations to the various
shelters. After two days, authorities requested a halt to all assistance in
kind and asked that, in the future, donations be limited to cash contributions
to a disaster relief fund. As a result, much public effort then went to
organizing benefits (concerts, plays, auctions, and boxing matches) to raise
money for the victims.
From the beginning, radio and television played a pivotal role in shaping
the public's response to the event. Because the day following the disaster
was a national holiday, no major newspaper accounts of the event were avail-
able until November 21. Radio and television filled this vacuum with compel-
ling on-the-scene accounts of the rescue efforts. In the hours following the
emergency, television and radio stations disseminated important information on
the location of evacuation shelters and the hospitals treating the victims.
In addition, television and radio played a role in coordinating individual
donations with particular needs and relief organizations. Television re-
porters were even able to help target assistance to specific shelters when
they notified their stations of specific needs at different relief centers.
This information was subsequently broadcast over the air to the public gener-
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ating prompt and appropriate contributions.
\."~nother example of public response to the disaster was the use of the
(
Basilica of Guadalupe during the days following the eXElos~?~ As thousands
of refugees, many of whom were injured, frightened, and disoriented, began to
arrive at. the shrine,~~~~ offi~ials decided to open the original edifice to
shelter the victims.iThis building, dating back to colonial times, has been
closed for over a decade because it is structurally unsound. Yet, for the
public at large, it is more venerated than its modern successor. As San
Juanico's victims flocked into the ancient shrine, hundreds of people from the
working-class neighborhoods in the vicinity brought them blankets, hot food,
and clothing.
(The scene of victims of a terrible industrial disaster spontaneously
"----.
seeking sanctuary at the Basilica where they were helped and fed by others of
humble means created a powerful emblematic image in the eyes of millions of
Mexican television viewers. However, in the following weeks the flow of pub-
lic solidarity diminished somewhat. By mid December an epidemic of 'San
Juanico' jokes raged through the city. Although television and radio refused
to air most of these jokes, generally regarded as "tasteless" and "cruel,"
many nightclub comedians delighted their well-heeled patrons with a cascade
of macabre puns and one-liners. These were subsquently repeated during pre-
Christmas parties so that each morning the city awoke to a new crop of grisly
jokes. The phenomenon did not pass unnoticed by working-class comedians and
others who condemned the class-biased nature of the humor. 28
In addition to the sour elements introduced by the San Juanico jokes
another, perhaps predictable, response emerged during the aftermath of the
disaster. This was the almost inevitable feeling that there was corruption
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among government officials carrying out the relief operations. A strong
consensus, nurtured by the metropolitan population's endemic cynicism, held
that authorities had pocketed most of the donations and that the victims had
only received a pittance.
Despite the cracks in public solidarity emerging in the weeks following
the disaster, \the people of San Juan Ixhuatepec were able to build new links
to certain middle-class groups. In addition to the involvement of private
voluntary and religious charitable organizations, a significant new link was
established with Mexico's most influential environmentalist group, EI Movi-
miento Ecologista Mexicano. The implications of this development will be dis-
cussed in the section to follow.
Despite the countercurrents cited above, the overwhelming public solid-
arity with the victims along with the widespread belief that San Juanico had
been ill-used by PEMEX, had one critical effect: it put considerable pressure
on the government to assist the victims, investigate the cause of the acci-
dent, and assign responsibility for the disaster. It also led people to raise
the possibility that other accidents and hazards were endemic to metropolitan
existence.
State vs. Community Decision Making
In the wake of the intense public pressure built up during the emergency,
it became critically important for the State to demonstrate that it was
actively helping the victims and, moreover, that solutions were in its hands.
Officials assimilated the rhetoric of solidarity, congratulating the public
for its outpouring of assistance, reassuring them at the same time that the
proper authorities had the situation well under control. As various govern-
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ment agencies did, in fact, assume control over decision making, many in the
community awoke to the fact that the State might be encroaching too far. Dis-
cussions in neighborhood assemblies led to the formal petitions described in
the prior section that articulated the community's most pressing concerns.
Some of these concerns involved the manner in which the government cap-
tured the phenomenon of solidarity and made it serve its own purposes. The
most obvious examples were the numerous official banners and slogans painted
on walls advertising the State's "solidarity with the people of San Juan
Ixhuatepec." Many in the community found these to be unnecessary, self-
serving, and offensive, and wanted them removed. 29
Another issue was the distribution of relief supplies which many resi-
dents viewed as fraught with problems and "irregularities." Whatever the
merit of these suspicions, many in the community felt that problems arose
because "outsiders were distributing food to outsiders."30 Many in San
Juanico believed that a local committee headed by the parish priest should
have organized these distributions so that assistance could reach the right
people. 31 -'i "
Another State decision which was bitterly resented by the survivors was
the government's refusal of outside (mostly North American) offers of special-
ized medical assistance for the burn victims. Officials had, indeed,
announced that Mexico could take care of its own people. However, the rela-
tives of those who were hospitalized with severe burns felt that matters of
national pride had little to do with them and that government officials should
not have taken upon themselves the right to reject this type of help.
The decisions involved in the matter of the political banners, relief
supply distribution, and medical care for burn victims affected relatively
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short-term, or in the case of the burn victims, individual, aspects of the
overall recovery effort. Other contested areas involved decisions with more
long-term, community-wide effects.
The principal focus of conflict was (and remains) the designation of the
14 hectare devastated zone as a park and the consequent displacement of almost
200 families from their homes and the community. \ From the community's point
of view the allocation of such a large ~mount of prime residential land for a
park was an inordinate luxury. The fact that the decision was made with vir-
tually no community input at a time when the affected families were scattered
in shelters, hospitals, and a distant housing project was viewed as highhanded
and arbitrary. The fact that the government has, so far, refused to consider
using a portion of this land to build houses for those who might wish to re-
turn reinforces community suspicions that the park is really intended as a
buffer between what remains of the old San Juanico and a facility PEMEX might
choose to construct in the future. 32
The Neighborhood Committee has established links with the Movimiento
Ecologista Mexicano, a growing environmental lobbying group comprised primari-
ly of middle-class professionals and planners. In the months and years to
come the limits to State authority may well be challenged over questions of
contested land use, including the size of the park, the permissible future
uses of the PEMEX site, and the relocation of the private gas firms still
operating in the area. (An alliance between a representative grass-roots pres-
sure group in San Juanico and the country's largest environmental organization
may be able to effect a long-term improvement in the valley's hazardous ecol-
ogy.
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Limited Options for a High Risk Setting
San Juan Ixhuatepec will, no doubt, be remembered both -in Mexico and
abroad as an example of a successful recovery from disaster. Many will com-
pare it favorably to the legal morass resulting from Bhopal. However, swift
compensation and a hastily constructed park do very little to change the
intrinsic hazardousness of a place like San Juanico. Measures leading to a
genuine reduction of overall risk for the survivors of the gas disaster are
considerably more costly and difficult to implement.
The community itself identified an important step: the relocation of
PEMEX and its associated private gas distributors. This demand was taken up
enthusiastically by the press, some opposition parties, and the public at
large. In the weeks following the disaster public consciousness was alerted
to other potential time bombs woven into the fabric of the city: the massive
Azcapotzalco refinery, the International Airport, and a munitions factory near
the center of town. While relocation of the Azcapotzalco refinery would
appear to be prohibitively expensive, there is considerable discussion about
decentralizing the city's gas provisioning system. However, as the head of
the private gas distributor's association aptly pointed out, the cost of gas
to consumers would undoubtedly rise as trucks would have to travel an extra
50 kilometers or more to reload. He might have added that trucking large
amounts of gas would also inevitably result in road accidents such as the 1978
collision of an LPG truck on the Mexico-Queretaro highway that resulted in up
to 100 casualties. 33 (While decentralization would reduce hazards for neigh-
~_.-
borhoods such as San Juanico, transporting large quantities of gas over
Mexico's congested highways may pose even higher overall levels of risk than
exist in the present system.
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A second measure to reduce the hazardousness of San Juan Ixhuatepec would
involve tighter controls and safety regulations governing the numerous remain-
ing industries handling dangerous materials. This option, while worthwhile,
runs into the familiar difficulties implicit in restraining industry during
difficult economic times.
It is unrealistic to expect environmental safety regulations to be im-
posed selectively upon industries in San Juan Ixhuatepec. However, certain
measures specific to San Juanico's environmental health might be more feasi-
ble. One example would be to cover the Remedios River, at present a steep-
banked open sewage canal. It appears that this measure might be carried out
in the near future as the result of a projected extension of the Anillo
Periferico, the urban freeway system. The Anillo would follow the river,
thereby covering it, but would also divide the community into two parts sep-
arated by a six lane highway.
A final measure that would decrease San Juanico's exposure to industrial
risk would be the implementation of a careful land use zoning plan aimed at
separating densely populated residential areas from facilities handling haz-
ardous materials as well as from those facilities' arteries of transit.
Unfortunately, owing to the speculative forces at work in the urban land mar-
ket, effective zoning is perhaps the most elusive goal of all. San Juan
Ixhuatepec's present land use is the outcome of a complex mosaic of tenure
rights and appropriations encompassing federally owned land such as that occu-
pied by PEMEX and the rail line, municipal property such as the Remedios
River, private holdings which are part of the open land market such as those
of the former hacienda and industrial firms, former peasant holdings which
enter a semi-open market, and nonmarket holdings characteristic of the hill-
side squatter settlements.
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An effective zoning plan must come to terms with these diverse forms of occu-
pance. Population pressures and vigorous speculative forces operating upon
real estate have so far defied most efforts at implementing existing zoning
and environmental regulations in Mexico City. Clearly San Juan Ixhuatepec's
plight is only a small part of a much larger chronic problem.
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NOTES
lSee E. Haas, R.W. Kates, M. Bowden, eds., Reconstruction Following
Disaster, MIT Press, 1977.
2According to A. Penafiel's Nombres Geograficos de Mexico, Mexico, 1885,
the prefex 'izhuatl' signifies 'leaf of green maize.'
3The painting depicting Fray Pedro de Valencia baptizing a man in Indian
garb dates from 1796. The church facade underwent renovation, including the
addition of a clock, in 1929.
-4- 4Mexico City, with a current population of roughly 18 million is expand-
ing at the rate of 1.5 million people a year making it the largest and the
most rapidly growing urban agglomeration in the Third World. Conservative
estimates project the city's population to be 26 million in the year 2000;
more pessimistic projections cite a population doubling to close to 36 million
people. See F. Pearce, "Mexico,- the city unlimited," in New Scientist,
October 18, 1984.
5Although, until recently, no systematic data were available, most ex-
perts agree that the combination of Mexico City's altitude, its basin topogra-
phy, and emissions from its largely unregulated industries and two to three
million vehicles, make its air pollution problem among the worst in the world.
According to one recent estimate Mexico City gen~rates 4,600 tons of air pol-
lutants a day, most of these in the northern sections of the city where most
of the factories are located. See R. Monje, "Alarma en el extranjero, no
aqu{, la veloz degradacion ecologica del Valle de Mexico," in Proceso, January
28, 1985.
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6In a November 26, 1984 article in Proceso magazine, Heberto Castillo
describes the hazards of Mexico City's system of underground gas pipelines,
many of which were installed over 20 years ago. Castillo warns that many of
these pipelines are damaged, obsolete, and prone to leaks. Most alarming,
Castillo asserts, is the fact that in many cases the plans locating some of
the older pipelines (including those in San Juan Ixhuatepec) have been lost,
making it extremely difficult to repair or replace them.
7personal communication by an official in the Federal District's
disaster planning unit, SIPROR, as well as by personal observation.
8PEMEX has consistently refused to release information which might shed
light on the cause or causes of the explosion. Extra official versions
abound. The most plausible explanation is that a leak from an overfilled tank
ignited and caused an explosion which subsequently resulted in a chain reac-
tion of explosions in the remaining tanks. This explanation is supported in
part by numerous statements made to the press by San Juanico residents who
observed that the flare that burns off excess gas was out during the weekend
preceding the Monday disaster. There also appears to be a consensus among
residents that a strong order of gas built up in the vicinity of the plant on
Sunday. The high casualty rate and a large proportion of the severe burn
cases can be attributed to the gas cloud that seeped into dwellings and set-
tled over the streets of the community during the course of Sunday night.
9This table was compiled on the basis of unverified and sometimes incon-
sistent newspaper accounts in Excelsior, Uno Mas Uno, and EI Universal.
houses.
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10Considerab1e discrepancies exist between extra official and official
estimates, and even among different official estimates, of the number of casu-
alties. Community estimates invariably tend to be higher than government
figures. Yet even the latter are often widely inconsistent. For example, the
Interministerial Commission issued a report on December 2, 1984 stating that
the number of wounded was 4248. However, another report compiled by the
Director of the State of Mexico's Occupational Safety Institute puts the
figure at "over 2000" (State of Mexico, 1985, pp. 3). A subsequent report
published in the April, 1985 issue of The Pan American Health Organization's
(PARO) "Disaster Preparedness in the Americas" records a mere 886 hospital
admissions resulting from the disaster.
11This plan of action is outlined in a report authored by Ing. Federico
Lopez de Alba, Director of the State of Mexico's Occupational Safety Insti-
tute, translated into English with the title "The San Juan Ixhuatepec Acci-
dent," State of Mexico, 1985.
12Field interview with Dr. Rodriguez Perez.
13Field interviews with relocated survivors in Valle de Anahuac.
14In the weeks following the disaster Mexico City and its surroundings
experienced critical shortages of domestic gas as PEMEX and the gas dlstribu-,
tors had to organize an alternative delivery system to make up for the 40% (
(
\
supply shortfall resulting from the San Juan Ixhuatepec facility's destruc- \
tion. Many people responded to the shortage by hoarding tanks of gas in thei;)
/This, in turn, resulted in several incidents in which individuals /
died from gas poisoning and explosions.
15Excelsior, December 23, 1984.
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16Field interview with Dr. Vasquez Caleb, in the San Juan Ixhuatepec
Health Center and visits to two compensation claims centers.
17Uno Mas Uno, November 22, 1984.
18Excelsior, November 26, 1984.
19Personal observation.
20Uno Mas Uno, December 17, 1984.
21People in San Juanico as well as the public at large were outraged by
what was widely regarded as arrogant stonewalling by PEMEX's director, Mario
Ramon Beteta. In particular, during one television interview when he was
asked whether PEMEX would compensate the disaster victims, Beteta exclaimed
that, as the prime. victim, PEMEX should be the first in line when compensa-
tions were handed out.
22Excelsior, December 24, 1984.
23Excelsior, December 27, 1984.
24Uno Mas Uno, January 2, 1985.
25Field interviews in San Juanico and Valle de Anahuac.
24, 1984.
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30Field interview in San Juanico.
31Field interviews in San Ju~nico.
32Field interviews in San Juanico and Valle de Anahuac.
33pEMEX has been plagued with accidents and, according to critics such as
Heberto Castillo, was criminally negligent in the case of maintenance and
safety at its San Juan Ixhuatepec facility, "La Comision de Seguridad de
Petroleos aviso de los graves riesgos en San Juanico," in Proceso, December
10, 1984. The table on the following page assembles a partial list of PEMEX
gas-related accidents in recent years.
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SOME RECENT PEMEX ACCIDENTS*
DATE
1963
1971
1977
1978
1978
1981
1982
1983
MARCH 1984
APRIL 1984
JUNE 1984
JULY 1984
JANUARY 1985
LOCATION
Azcapotzalco Refinery
Mazatlan Port
Azcapotzalco Refinery
Mexico-Queretaro
highway
Santa Cruz
Veracruz
Mexico City Vicinity
Azcapotzalco Refinery
San Juan Ixhuatepec
Acachapan, Tabasco
Colmenas, Tabasco
Los Pajaritos, Veracruz
Cui dad Juarez
SCALE
4 tanks of jet fuel explode
Gasoline pipeline spill results in
large fire
Fire, 10 injured
LPG truck collides, fire and
explosion kill 100 and injure
100
Methane gas explosion, 52 victims
LPG pipeline leak' explosion and
fire destroy settlement
Pipeline explosion kills 10 and
injures 30
Fire
Fire and explosion near storage
tanks, residents evacuated at
9 pm
Gas pipeline explosion, 11 dead
and 44 injured
Gas pipeline explosion, settlement
destroyed
Ammonia gas pipeline leak kills 4
and injures 46
Gas pipeline explodes killing 1
and injuring 29
*This is an incomplete list compiled from a variety of unverified extra offi-
cial sources. Hith the exception of the San Juan Ixhuatepec and the
Azacapotzalco refineries, only transport and storage accidents are recorded.
